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1957] RECENT DECISIONS 593 
CORPORATIONS-SECURITIES :REGULATION-PARENT CORPORATION AS INSIDER 
REALIZING SHORTSWING PROFIT-Parent corporation, owning a majority of 
the outstanding voting securities of its subsidiary, sold 120,000 shares of 
the subsidiary's common stock. A substantial shortswing profit was realized 
on 4115 shares which had been purchased on the open market five months 
earlier.1 The sale, whereby the parent was to divest itself of control of its 
subsidiary, was made pursuant to an agreement between both companies 
and approved by a majority of the voting stock of each. Section 16 (b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 provides that officers, directors and 
beneficial owners of more than ten percent of any class of equity securities 
shall be liable to the issuing corporation for any profit realized from the 
sale of its securities held for less than six months. Plaintiff brought a share-
holder derivative action on behalf of the subsidiary against the parent un-
der section 16 (b). On appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, held, 
affirmed. The agreement between parent and subsidiary which induced 
the sale does not prevent recovery for the benefit of the subsidiary under 
section 16 (b). The clear language and purpose of the statute precludes an 
estoppel based upon instigation by or benefit to the subsidiary. Magida 
v. Continental Gan Company, (2d Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 843. 
At common law the majority rule is that no fiduciary duty exists between 
a director or officer and the individual shareholder of a corporation with 
respect to the stock of the corporation.3 Thus, a director or officer is under 
no legal compulsion to disclose any "inside" information to individual 
shareholders when dealing in equity securities of a corporation.4 Section 
16 (b) was designed to minimize the use of inside information by persons 
who stand in such relation to the corporation that they are likely to have 
access to special information.5 The difficulties inherent in proving the 
actual use of inside information6 and the impossible task in most cases 
1 In May 1950 the parent owned approximately 51.9% of the subsidiary's outstanding 
preferred stock and approximately 59.2% of its common stock. The parent sold all the 
preferred stock to the subsidiary. The sale of 120,000 shares of common stock reduced 
the parent's holding to about 20% of the entire issue of common stock. 
2 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78p (b). 
s Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 90 N.W. 406 (1902); Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 
Barb. (N.Y.) 581 (1868); Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266 (1922). Contra, 
Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903). See generally 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933). 
4 Legal writers are vigorously opposed to the rule. For an extensive compilation of 
articles see Yourd, "Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 
16 of the Securities Exchange Act," 38 MICH. L. REv. 133, n. 31 (1939). 
5 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., (7th Cir. 1955) 217 
F. (2d) 56, cert. den. 348 U.S. 982 (1955), reh. den. 349 U.S. 948 (1955); Truncale v. 
Blumberg, (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 387; Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 
(S.D. N.Y. 1952) 104 F. Supp. 957. 
o See the testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, chief spokesman for the draftsmen of 
the act in S. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 84, 
72d Cong., 2d sess., and S. Res. 56, S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d sess., p. 6557 (1934). 
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of ascertaining who actually suffered the loss, led the framers of section 
16 (b) to provide absolute liability to the company for all shortswing profits 
irrespective of the intent of the insider.7 In the principal case~ these abso-
lute rules combine to produce some outward inequities and perhaps dem-
onstrate some real limitations. The primary contention of the parent was 
that it would be inequitable to allow a suit on behalf of the subsidiary in 
view of the fact that the subsidiary had instigated the plan of sale and had 
materially benefited from its operation. The rejection of this defense 
appears to be justified in light of the objective sought to be accomplished 
by the statute. Section 16 (b) was not designed to compensate the issuer 
corporation. Recovery by the issuer is provided only as a practical expe-
dient. 8 The sole objective of the statute is to remove the incentive to make 
shortswing profits by removing the profits.9 _ Therefore, the fact that the 
shortswing sale produces a benefit to the issuer or its shareholders is im-
material.10 Furthermore, rejection of the estoppel doctrine seems justified 
since in most instances the parent-insider can dictate the policies of the 
subsidiary and, in all cases, can provide majority shareholder approval of 
any plan or policy decision. Although it may be argued that section 16 (b) 
was not designed to deter shortswing sales by a parent of its subsidiary's 
securities, the clear language and purpose of section 16 (b) admit no such 
exception. It may be questioned, however, whether or not the primary 
objective of the st'atute to provide a strong deterrent to the use of inside 
information is realized in the parent-insider situation. The recovery by 
the subsidiary will necessarily be reflected in an increase in the value of the 
equitable interest of the parent, and although this is undoubtedly not as 
desirable as a cash profit it is perhaps more appealing than not using inside 
information to any advantage whatsoever.11 When, as in the principal case 
the shortswing transaction itself operates to reduce the insider's equitable 
interest to relatively low levels, the full impact of the statute is felt, but as a 
1 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., (S.D.N.Y. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 758, affd. (2d Cir. 1943) 
136 F. (2d) 231, cert. den. 320 U.S 751 (1943); Gratz v. Claughton, (2d Cir. 1951) 187 
F. (2d) 46, cert. den. 341 U.S. 920 (1951). 
8 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., note 5 supra. 
9 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., note 7 supra; Commissioner of Internal Revenue ·v. 
Obear-Nester Glass Co., note 5 supra. The original bill provided for criminal sanctions 
in addition to the civil recovery. See testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran in S. Hearings 
before the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 84, 72d Cong., 2d sess., and 
S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d sess., pp. 6556, 6557 (1934). 
10 In this regard, §29 (a) of the act, 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78cc (a) 
provides: "Any condition, stipulation or provision binding any person to waive com-
pliance with any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder . . . shall 
be void." This section would seem to eliminate a defense based on estoppel. Cf. Jeffer-
son Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, (E.D. La. 1952) 104 F. Supp. 20, affd. (5th Cir. 1953) 202 
F. (2d) 433, cert. den. 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, (2d Cir. 1947) 160 
F. (2d) 984, cert. den. 332 U.S. 761 (1947). Cf. Consolidated Engineering Corp. v. Nesbit, 
(S.D. Cal. 1951) 102 F. Supp. 112. 
11 This limitation on the deterrent effect of the statute is present even at low 
percentages of insider ownership, but the greater the equitable interest, the less will be 
the real loss sustained by the insider by virtue of the profit recovery accruing to the issuer. 
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general proposition large holders of equity securities who remain so after 
a shortswing profit have relatively little to lose by operation of the 
statute. The existence of this limitation is, of course, not a justification for 
allowing the parent-insider to retain shortswing profits, thereby eliminating 
all deterrent effect, but it is perhaps indicative of a need for revision in the 
recovery feature of the statute. 
Allan L. Bio[! 
